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Rethinking Secularism in Europe  
 
Lorenzo Zucca 
 
The paper argues that secularism in Europe needs to be fundamentally reconsidered. Everywhere 
European secular states face a double threat: on one hand fundamentalist religion, on the other negative 
secularism. Firstly, the paper will explain what is negative secularism and why it is a problem rather 
than an asset. It will then elaborate a new conception of positive secularism that can be understood 
either as a political or as an ethical project. Either way, the point of positive secularism is to distance 
itself from religion in order to embrace diversity of all types, religious and non-religious. Political 
secularism, however, relies on an elusive hope of reaching overlapping consensus between religious 
and non-religious people. Ethical secularism aims instead to protect diversity by promoting the 
establishment of a marketplace of religions, which acknowledges a public role for religion while 
regulating it. The marketplace of religions promotes religious pluralism and helps to iron out the 
different treatments between religions. Ethical secularism aims to be a worldview of worldviews that 
creates the preconditions for all religious and non-religious people to live well together.  
 
Intro  
 
A spectre is haunting Europe — the spectre of secularism. All the powers of old 
Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Putin, 
Merkel and Hollande, French intellectuals and the European Court of Human Rights.1 
Everywhere the secular state is under threat. One obvious threat comes from the 
revival of religion in Europe, and in particular its extremist manifestation.2 The 
tragedy of Charlie Hebdo shows the cleavage between European states and extremist 
minorities. A second threat comes from the spread of negative secularism: religion is 
regarded as an enemy of the secular state. This kind of secularism is historically 
dated, legally inapplicable and politically inadequate. The view I’m rejecting is 
exemplified by the standard French position of ideological laïcité, which gave rise to 
the recent statute banning burquas in public streets. This ideological interpretation of 
laïcité suggests that religion can only be free as a purely private and inward looking 
practice: instead of understanding religion, ideological forms of secularism attempt to 
deny its social role and meaning and confine religious practices in private spaces. 
 
Europe needs to rethink secularism and freedom of religion fundamentally. To be 
sure, freedom of religion in a secular age is a paradox: why single out for special 																																																								
1 This is adapted from Karl Marx’s Manifesto. 
2 See for example, Susanna Mancini and Michel Rosenfeld (eds), Constitutional Secularism in an Age 
of Religious Revival, Oxford: OUP, 2014. 
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protection something that is no longer special? Courts are central players in this 
paradox. They do decide when a claim is deep enough to be a claim of conscience.3 
They are asked to discriminate between what is religion and what is not.4 The second 
paradox flows from the first; in a secular age, religion does not have a stable 
definition; as a result secularism is much harder to define: it just turns out to be a 
denial of whatever happens to be identified as religion. But since no legal definition 
of religion is neutral, then the denial of an ideological position is also an ideological 
position. This is what characterizes negative secularism, namely the view that the 
secular state should focus on the denial of religion’s place in the public sphere.  
I suggest instead that secularism should be thought of as a positive attitude towards 
all forms of diversity in the society, including religious views. I call this positive 
secularism; its point is not to deny religion’s place in the public sphere, but to 
promote diversity of worldviews.5  
European Courts, I shall argue, have a special responsibility: to promote diversity of 
worldviews and pluralism throughout Europe. Courts have an incredibly expansive 
role to play here. They define religion when they are asked to protect freedom of 
religion. And negatively, they also define secularism. Moreover they have to manage 
the attitude of political institutions towards religion. Finally, they have to make sure 
that diversity does not threaten political unity. For the moment, they have abdicated 
their responsibility: they oscillate between two sides that can be illustrated through 
two recent landmark cases of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): Lautsi v 
Italy6 and SAS v France.7 In the first case, the crucifix is held to be a passive symbol 
and therefore acceptable in the public classroom. In the second case, the full-face veil 
is considered as a bar to living together and therefore prohibited as a form of private 
clothing. Such a glaring double standard points to the existence of in-built biases in 
favor of majority religions and against minority beliefs. European secular states do 
not know how to cope with religious diversity. Their secularism oscillates between a 																																																								3	Taylor	and	McLure,	Secularism	and	Freedom	of	Conscience,	Harvard	University	Press	(2011).	4	See	Lorenzo	Zucca,	A	Marriage	Made	in	Heaven?	The	relationship	between	religious	pluralism	and	secularism,	in	Ferran	Requejo	and	Camil	Ungureanu	(eds),	Democracy,	Law	and	Religious	
Pluralism	in	Europe:	Secularism	and	Post-Secularism,	Ashgate	(2014).	
5 A similar distinction is offered by Charles Taylor ‘How to define Secularism,’ in Alfred Stepan and 
Charles Taylor (eds), Boundaries of Toleration, Columbia University Press (2014).  
6 Lautsi v. Italy, no. 30814/06, 18 March 2011.  
7 S.A.S v France. no. 43835/11, 1 July 2014. 
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negative attitude towards minorities and a positive attitude towards traditional 
majorities.  
 
European Courts have to be bolder: in order to address the damning problem of the 
double standard, the point is to move beyond the negative conception of secularism 
that they attack. In section 1, I will illustrate the ways in which the ECtHR is stuck 
with a negative conception of secularism. To go beyond it one needs to develop a new 
conception of secularism, which I call positive secularism. Section 2 will present two 
possible variants of positive secularism and it will illustrate how positive secularism 
could inform the practice of the ECtHR so as to nudge European states into being 
secular in a way that is compatible with religious pluralism.  
 
1. Negative Secularism 
Negative secularism is defined in opposition to religion. It carves out a domain for 
religion and one for secular politics. It was simple to understand what secularism and 
its point were when European states were culturally and religiously homogeneous. 
Christian religion and secularism were the two sides of the same coin. Christianity 
was not contested as a metaphysical doctrine or as an ethical standpoint. This was 
Europe after the Treaties of Westphalia: religious homogeneity was engineered in 
order to avoid conflicts between Catholics and Protestants. Ejus regio, cujus religio 
(to each kingdom its own religion) was the formula behind the birth of European 
nation states. From this viewpoint, secularism was just a compromise between each 
state and its own religious majority.8 Today’s Europe has changed beyond recognition 
since 1648. Three centuries later, and after two world wars, the European system of 
nation states had to be re-considered. The UDHR, which inspired the ECHR, and the 
Treaty of Rome that lays the foundation of the EU, regard human rights as the 
necessary limitation of state sovereignty. European human rights protect diversity of 
worldviews over homogeneity and European Courts have to act accordingly. 9 
Negative secularism was formulated in a historical context where the secular state had 
to free itself from one dominant religion: the French State had to distance itself from 																																																								8	Lorenzo	Zucca,	A	Secular	Europe.	Law	and	Religion	in	the	European	Constitutional	Landscape,	OUP	(2012).		9	Eva	Brems	(ed.),	Diversity	and	European	Human	Rights.	Rewriting	Judgements	of	the	ECHR,	CUP	(2015).	
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the interference of the Catholic Church and did so with the statute of 1905, which 
formulated the legal principle of laicite’.10 Today, laicite’ is interpreted as denying 
religion any place in the public sphere, and securing its liberty only in the private 
sphere. Such interpretation is an ideological distortion of the principle of legal laicite 
which simply requested the separation between church and state. In what follows I 
criticize the position of the ECtHR for embracing a negative idea of secularism that 
portrays it in turn as a private conviction (a), as an ideology (b) or as a biased stance 
against minority religions (c). These three mistakes are part of a negative project of 
secularism (d) that needs to be abandoned.   
 
a. Secularism as private conviction 
 
Secularism is not à la page in Strasbourg. In the Lautsi saga, the ECtHR had to decide 
whether Italy was violating the right of parents to have their children educated in a 
way that is compatible with their convictions. Mrs Lautsi complained in particular 
that the presence of the crucifix interfered with the secular education expected in a 
state school. 
 
In the last resort, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR concluded that Italy has the 
freedom to decide whether to hang a crucifix in public school’s classrooms without 
infringing the right of parents to have their children educated according to their own 
religious or philosophical convictions.  
 
At the chamber level, the decision went in the opposite direction. Secularism featured 
prominently and determined the outcome of the case in favor of the applicants, the 
Lautsi family: the court decided that the state has an obligation of neutrality in light of 
its secular nature. As a consequence, the wall of the classroom had to be blank, since 
the presence of any symbol would breach the state commitment to neutrality on one 
hand, and the parents’ right to educate their children according to their own religious 
or philosophical convictions. The Chamber presented secularism as Mrs Lautsi’s 
philosophical conviction. The idea needs to be criticized as it portrays secularism as 
radically subjective: one of the many beliefs that can be held by people. This will turn 																																																								10	Olivier	Roy,	Secularism	confronts	Islam,	Columbia	University	Press	(2009).	
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out to be a major conceptual and strategic mistake. It is a conceptual mistake because 
it confuses the secular nature of the state with individual preferences of the parents.  
Secularism as a conviction is at best a by-product of state secularism; it should not be 
boxed into the language of art. 2 protocol 1, which reads as follows: “No person shall 
be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in 
relation to education and teaching, the state shall respect the rights of parents to 
ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and 
philosophical convictions.”  The court links parental secular convictions to 
secularism, thereby creating a basic confusion that still lingers on: the idea is that 
secularism could be considered as one of the many possible individual convictions, 
rather than the most important political project that Europe has embraced since the 
end of the wars of religions. Secularism in European constitutional history is a 
political project according to which the state should be run independently from the 
dominant religion in a given society. To present it instead as a philosophical 
conviction of the parents leads people to believe that secularism is an optional way of 
leading the state’s business.11 There is not a single European state that is not secular 
to a greater or lesser extent. The converse of being a secular state would amount to 
being a theocratic state.  
 
The Chamber’s judgment makes a strategic mistake as well: by insisting that the wall 
of the classroom should respect parents’ convictions, the court is preparing the scene 
for the perfect storm. Why would the secular convictions of some parents be 
preferable over the religious convictions of other parents? Put this way, it becomes 
impossible to defend state neutrality. The state has no ability to choose between two 
convictions neutrally. It is either one or the other. The problem here is that the state’s 
default secular position as a guarantee of all convictions has been undermined by the 
move of the court that unwittingly put religious convictions and secular convictions 
on a par, as if the two were mutually exclusive and addressed the same set of beliefs. 
Herein lies one of the great weaknesses of negative secularism: it tends to simplify 
reality into two polar opposite. By the same token, it equalizes them. Religious 
convictions and secular convictions have the same value in the eye of the court.   
 																																																								
11 Even theocracies cannot do away with a minimum commitment to secularism. 
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The opponents of secularism raised their glasses. The Catholic Church, together with 
Russia, and other intervening states, banqueted on the corpse of secularism. The 
political battle begun and it aimed to assert the Christian roots of the European 
project. Lautsi’s Chamber decision gave the opportunity to religious people to call for 
more representation of religion at the national and supranational level. The Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR tried to limit the damage but the faux pas had already been 
taken. To present secularism as an individual conviction empowered religious 
convictions to claim equal treatment before the law and in the court. The alleged 
neutrality of the secular state had been compromised in the quest of protecting the 
secular views of the Lautsi family.  
 
Some of the concurring opinions –in particular Judge Bonello’s—went a long way in 
delegitimizing secularism as the defining trait of European states and of Europe as a 
whole. In his colorful concurring opinion, Bonello claims that: “in Europe, secularism 
is optional, freedom of religion is not.”12 This is a highly controversial claim. As 
pointed out, the converse of secularism is theocracy. It is hard to find examples of 
theocratic societies where freedom of religion is upheld. We can try to be charitable 
with Bonello: he may be suggesting that secularism is a defining trait of constitutional 
democracies, but not of an international system of human rights. However, even that 
claim is highly controversial. There is a minimal sense in which an international 
system of human rights is necessarily secular in so far that it has to refrain from 
taking the viewpoint of any given religion so as to be capable to protect all religions 
equally. 
 
So the question is not whether secularism is optional or not; the question is which 
secularism is best suited to an international system of human rights. Moreover, it is 
hard to imagine how freedom of religion could be protected in a non-secular political 
space. Let us imagine –this time it is not hard to do—a state that is run on religious 
precepts taken from one religion. In this case, the majority’s religion does not need 
freedom, since it has power. Other religions in this non-secular framework will enjoy 
freedom only to the extent that the majority’s religion is willing to give it to them as a 
concession that can always be withdrawn. It follows that, contrary to what Bonello 																																																								
12 Lautsi v. Italy, no. 30814/06, 18 March 2011, paragraph 25, p.40. 
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claims, freedom of religion as a human right can only truly exist in a secular 
framework that does not discriminate between any religion. Bonello’s mistake is to 
believe that freedom of religion and secularism can be easily detached one from 
another. Interestingly, Bonello also acknowledges that: “I believe anyone could 
persuasively try to argue that the presence of the crucifix in Italian State schools 
might possibly offend the doctrine of secularism and that of the separation between 
Church and State.” At this point, the opinion of Bonello has changed tone: He 
recognizes that secularism is not an option. But he would like to suggest that the task 
of the court does not include the review of a measure incompatible with the principle 
of secularism. The court’s job, according to Bonello, is simply to protect the right to 
freedom of religion of the parents. Again, there is a distortion taking place here: 
firstly, the Lautsi family is not complaining about their right to freedom of religion, 
but about their right to have an education for their children in a non-religious 
environment. The question is whether the crucifix, which is a religious symbol, gives 
the environment a religious connotation. To answer this question one has to engage 
with the boundary that lies between a religious and a secular environment. The Grand 
Chamber, by deciding that the Italy is free to keep the crucifix in Italian state school, 
is implicitly asserting that the presence of that symbol is compatible with the principle 
that state school should by law be secular spaces.  
 
b. Secularism as Ideology 
 
Part of the blame for being in this predicament should be laid at the door of 
secularism as a political project. Secularism is the product of historical events that 
pitted Church against the State and produced a series of ready-made doctrines to cope 
with such a problem: the most famous, and the most controversial, is the doctrine of 
the separation between Church and State. The wall of separation has been exposed as 
a deficient metaphor in the US, Europe and India.13 When we look at the reality of the 
relation between Church and State, it can hardly be described as a form of mutual 
segregation. Religious symbols, practices and beliefs enter the political realm as much 
as state laws enter the religious one. 																																																								
13 L. Sager and C. Eisgruber, Religious Freedom and the Constitution, Cambridge, Mass: HUP (2010); 
Rajeev Bhargava, “Should Europe learn from Indian secularism?,” available at http://www.india-
seminar.com/2011/621/621_rajeev_bhargava.htm.  
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Originally, secularism was thought of as a good faith attempt to resolve a conflict; the 
idea was to allow the state to free itself from the bonds of one religion (or of many 
religions) in order to be the state of all the citizens. In order to treat everyone equally, 
the state had to be blind to religious symbols, and deaf vis-à-vis religious beliefs. One 
can readily see, however, how good intentions can be transformed in evil plans. From 
a legal-constitutional project, secularism was turned into a social ideology according 
to which religion should be relegated to the private sphere. This is what happened in 
France with the Loi 1905 on laïcité: the statute did not originally claim that religion 
should be silenced in the public sphere. It simply attended to draw a line between 
church and state. But on time it was taken to represent a negative indictment of 
religion’s presence in public. 
 
In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Power stubbed secularism in its ideological 
back: “To my mind, the Chamber Judgment was striking in its failure to recognize 
that secularism (which was the applicant’s preferred belief or world view) was, in 
itself, one ideology among others.”14 I believe instead that Judge Power’s concurring 
opinion is striking in its failure to recognize that secularism is not only another 
ideology, but also the backbone of any modern state. I readily recognize that that 
backbone has been used with negative effects upon religion, and I also recognize that 
it is high time to re-think secularism for an entirely new world. The historical context 
has changed beyond recognition, and the chief aim of the secular state is not to deny 
religion a place in the public sphere as the French conception of laicite does.15 Rather, 
the secular state has the task of protecting religious and non-religious ways of 
thinking as part of a plural and diverse society. To do so the secular state needs a 
framework, which guarantees that no particular view can be imposed over other 
people.  
 
Secularism does not have to be an ideological stance against religion. It is fair to say 
that that might have been the interpretation of Mrs Lautsi, but that should not be the 
way in which the state interprets secularism. If and when the state interprets it that 
way, it is fair to criticize the state for not giving religion its due, and for unduly 																																																								
14 Lautsi v. Italy, no. 30814/06, 18 March 2011. pp. 44-45. 15	Olivier	Roy,	Secularism	confronts	Islam,	Columbia	University	Press,	(2009).	
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burdening it. A different, possible, interpretation of secularism brings us back to 
secularism as a collective political project to guarantee the co-existence of different 
beliefs and ideologies. Judge Power chastised the Chamber for elevating secularist 
ideology over all other ideologies. But my point is that secularism properly conceived 
is not at all an ideology; it is the necessary pre-condition for beliefs and ideologies to 
co-exist in the same space. Secularism should be conceived of as a normative 
requirement to respect any kind of diversity of religious and non-religious type. It 
does not merely amount to a position arrived at through (overlapping) consensus 
amongst people who want to live in the same space. In Europe, such consensus would 
be hard to formulate against the background of a set of political societies that have 
been based on homogeneity rather than diversity. 
 
Judge Power would like to salvage neutrality from the damning criticisms issued 
against the Chamber’s decision. She attempted to do so by severing neutrality from 
secularism, and by suggesting instead that neutrality is better served by a general 
commitment to pluralism: “Neutrality requires a pluralist approach on the part of the 
State, not a secularist one. It encourages respect for all world views rather than a 
preference for one.”16  It is very difficult to conceive of a non-secular state that would 
promote respect for all religions. The European experience teaches us precisely that 
when one religious view is in charge, other religious views can at best expect 
toleration. In the same vein, it is hard to imagine how a non-secular state could 
promote pluralism without having to deny the primacy of the religious views in which 
it believes. If we were to believe the Court, secularism is just another ideology. It is a 
partial view of the world that is on a par with many other political ideologies, 
including religious views.  It is undeniable that French secularism based on the Loi of 
1995 was firstly conceived of as a legal separation between church and state but then 
became an ideological stance that relegated religion to the realm of private life. 
However, the fact that laicite were transformed into an ideological stance, does not 
mean that secularism is an ideology as any other. If we were to replace secularism 
with any other religious ideology, the result would not be the automatic protection of 
religious pluralism. The link between pluralism and secularism is hard to deny: 
secularism may be an ideology, but it is crucially an ideology that promotes diversity 																																																								
16 Lautsi v. Italy, no. 30814/06, 18 March 2011, p. 44. 
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above homogeneity. This is not true of other ideologies, in particular of religious 
ideologies who would be happy to maintain a privileged status for one religion. 
 
c. Secularism and Islamophobia  
 
The paradoxical consequence of Lautsi’s decision is Strasbourg’s neutrality vis-à-vis 
national arrangements that are paradigm cases of negative secularism: France and 
Turkey spring to mind. In which way is the ECtHR protecting freedom of religion in 
the case of SAS v France? France decides to criminalize the wearing of the full-face 
veil in Public Street and the court decides that the ban is compatible with freedom.17  
What could justify such a ban? The court suggests that the individual right to freedom 
of religion can be limited on the grounds of the rights of others.18 But in this case, 
what are the rights of others that are at stake? Why should I have a right against 
someone who decides to cover her face? I may want to wear a carnival mask on a 
daily basis, would that violate the rights of others? There is very little that can fit the 
bill: there is no tangible right of others that can be singled out. Compare with Lautsi: 
the readily identifiable ‘right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in 
conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions (art. 2 protocol 1)’ 
is treated as not having been infringed because Mrs Lautsi cannot prove the impact of 
the presence of the crucifix on her children. In SAS, the court argues that the wearing 
of the full veil on public streets has a sizable impact on the French republican 
principle of living together. 
 
The court attempted to give some content by subscribing to the principle evoked by 
the French government: living together. Wearing the full-face veil, according to the 
French government would prevent people from forming the necessary bonds in a 
society. While it may be correct that a full-face veil creates an obstacle to immediate 
socialization, it is unclear why it would violate the rights of others. Living together 
does not provide the necessary content. More importantly, it is impossible to 
understand why secularism in Lautsi is presented as an abstract doctrine that has no 
connection with the rights of the convention, while living together is accepted as a 
meaningful position that gives content to the rights of others. There is a strong 																																																								17	S.A.S v France. no. 43835/11, 1 July 2014.	18	S.A.S v France. no. 43835/11, 1 July 2014.	
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presumption here that the court uses abstract principles to suit its political preferences. 
In the case of SAS, living together rings as a pretext to impose the views of the 
majority as to what symbols and clothing are considered to be conducive to stronger 
social bonds. If anything the principle of living together should encourage more 
understanding of alternative ways of life –here we are talking of two thousand women 
in the whole country—rather than aggressively single out those people who are 
deemed to be inacceptable.  
 
There you can see the germ of the French legislation banning the full-face veil in 
public streets. A confusion that lingers on in this debate has to do with the distinction 
between private and public. Is walking down the street a public act? More 
importantly, to insist on the idea that religion is free in the private realm, and that 
people should strip themselves of religious clothes and symbols create an extra 
burden for religious people when compared to non-religious people. In other words, 
non-religious people are the model citizens while religious people have to behave as if 
they were non-religious when they step in the public sphere. Another source of doubt 
comes from the sociological analysis of the full-face veil in France. The number of 
women wearing it is extremely limited: two thousand women out of a minority of four 
million people.19 It is therefore possible to carry out interviews with a great number of 
them and learn that their motivation is largely individual and even goes against the 
grain of the community that opposes such practices.  
 
France asks everyone not to take offense if religion is ridiculed. But then it takes 
offence if someone wears its own religious symbols while walking down the street. 
This is another double standard that needs to be unraveled and discussed. In neither of 
the case, offense seems to be sufficient to regulate the relevant behavior. Behind the 
benign face of neutrality, hides the dark face of double standard; Christian religion 
can be embraced by a secular state as a form of tradition. But when other religious 
traditions claim freedom of religion, they are silenced in the name of the requirement 
of living together. The irony (and the deep sadness) lies in the fact that Lautsi had 
allowed the display of the majority’s religious symbol in a classroom, pointing out 
that secularism is just an individual conviction like any other. In SAS a minority’s 																																																								
19 Eva Brems, ‘The experience of face veil wearers in Europe and the law,’ in Eva	Brems	(ed.),	
Diversity	and	European	Human	Rights.	Rewriting	Judgements	of	the	ECHR,	CUP,	(2015). 
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religious symbol in the public street is prohibited, on the grounds that it is 
incompatible with an ideological understanding of French secularism. The morale is 
that freedom of religion amounts to the protection of whatever the majority happens 
to believe, be it religious or secular ideology. It is high time to rethink secularism and 
freedom of religion in a way that truly promotes living together –minority and 
majority alike. 
 
d.  Secularism as a negative project 
 
Secularism is associated with disenchantment: from a world full of religious meaning, 
we come to a world emptied of its spiritual and magical content.20 Some feel nostalgia 
for a world that has disappeared and that will not come back.21 Secularism is not so 
much to blame here, but it is regarded as the empty alternative that has come to the 
scene. It does not make up for the loss incurred. It does not propose anything. It lacks 
the vision or the teleology that was provided for by religion. How can we possibly 
subscribe to a negative project that does not offer any substantive value to guide the 
society, a view that requires taking a negative stance towards religion? 
 
The first step in that quest is to separate the concept of secularism from the concept of 
religion. If the two are too tightly linked, then secularism can only be understood as 
the denial of religion. There are many problems with such a negative approach, but 
the most daunting lies in the fact that there is no definition of religion in the first 
place. Thus, it is also impossible to define secularism; if anything it will be identified 
with whatever opposes religious beliefs and practices. But what if some of those 
religious beliefs and practices are part and parcel of the constitution of a society? To 
oppose them, would amount to oppose the very identity of a society. Does secularism 
amount to the denial that some political societies define themselves in relation to 
religious beliefs or practices?  
 
Needless to say, it would be detrimental for secularism to do so. In fact, it seems 
unavoidable to detach the concept of secularism from that of religion. In particular, it 
is impossible to take theology as a starting point for a definition of religion. More 																																																								
20 C. Taylor, ‘Disenchantment- Re-enchantment’, in G. Levine, The Joy of Secularism, PUP (2012).  
21 Taylor is amongst those who are nostalgic of a Christian past, regarded as a more meaningful past.  
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precisely any type of monotheistic religion that comes with a theological apparatus 
has to be put aside in order to make space for non-monotheistic concepts of religion. 
Religion cannot be defined in relation to the presence of one God. It is equally clear 
that there is no secular definition of religion from an external viewpoint to religion: 
endless attempts have been attempted without success.22 Religion defines itself from 
within. The problem arises when religion needs the official stamp of the state in order 
to benefit from a number of benefits or exemptions.  
 
It is interesting to note that judges are now being forced to reconsider their narrow 
assumptions as to what qualifies as religious. Once the monotheistic definition is 
swept under the carpet, it is hard to think of what could replace it to provide a stable 
yardstick with which to draw the boundary between religion and non-religion: that is 
to say, for many, between religion and the secular. It seems as if judges are slowly 
moving towards a more empirical approach, which takes into account actual social 
and cultural practices.23 The challenge for all judges is to come up with a legal 
definition of religion that is truly reflective of religious diversity in Europe. This is an 
Herculean task that will transform in a Sisyphus struggle. A secular court cannot 
define religion because it is required to refrain from engaging with internal 
theological arguments. The seeming impasse can be dealt with by accepting that 
courts cannot provide a bright line rule between religion and non-religion. At best 
they can gather evidence from all parties involved and attempt a case-by-case 
approach open to revision. Also, courts can  
 
THE ECtHR attaches a great importance to liberal neutrality, while being very 
deferential to the way in which nation states defines it. In those two landmark cases, 
the court approves of the status quo: France is neutral when banning burqua on public 
streets; Italy is neutral when defending the crucifix in public schools. Today the status 
quo is particularly problematic given the deep change of social context. The role of 
the ECtHR should be more positive: to question nation states on their commitments 
rather than subscribe to, and rubber-stamp, them. The court’s position vis-à-vis 
																																																								22	See	for	example	Brian	Leiter,	Why	Tolerate	Religion?,	Princeton	University	Press	(2012).		23	Lorenzo	Zucca,	‘A	Marriage	Made	in	Heaven?	The	relationship	between	religious	pluralism	and	secularism’,	in	Ferran	Requejo	and	Camil	Ungureanu	(eds),	Democracy,	Law	and	Religious	
Pluralism	in	Europe:	Secularism	and	Post-Secularism,	Ashgate	(2014).	
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negative secularism can be understood, but this does not mean that secularism is 
altogether incapable to provide a sound basis for the interpretation of human rights.  
 
2. Positive Secularism  
 
Positive secularism is not defined in opposition to religion.24 It is not about separation 
between church and state, nor is it about privatization of religion. Crucially it does not 
attempt to define religion from the standpoint of secular reason. Positive secularism is 
about the protection and promotion of diversity of worldviews. There are two ways of 
doing so: Charles Taylor’s political secularism suggests that liberal democracies have 
to cope with diversity by seeking to uphold consensus wherever possible; the other 
option, which I defend here, is by showing that diversity is ethically superior over 
homogeneity. My account can be called ethical secularism, and can be contrasted to 
Taylor’s political secularism.   
 
The two accounts have nevertheless many points in common.25 Neither Taylor’s, nor 
my account, define secularism in opposition to religion. But Taylor’s account of 
secularism is political in the Rawlsian sense: it works along the lines of public reason, 
and defines it as that set of reasons that would be followed by reasonable people.26 
My account starts from the acknowledgement that even reasonable people have in-
built biases that are part of their beliefs and practices. The double standard applied by 
the ECtHR, exemplified by the opposite treatment of Christian and Islamic symbols, 
is an example of such bias and it affects the decisions of allegedly reasonable judges 
and all other policy makers. It is not possible to ask the state, or its officials, to be 
neutral between their own biases and other religious views. The first difference 
between those two positive accounts is a practical concern: how does one remove the 
bias? Taylor’s political account would trust the state to be a neutral arbiter between 
reasons that are public and reasons that are not. I believe instead that the state cannot 
be neutral at least as long as it has not freed itself from those in-built biases. Firstly it 																																																								
24 C. Taylor, ‘How to define Secularism,’ in Alfred Stepan and Charles Taylor (eds), Boundaries of 
Toleration, Columbia University Press (2014). 
25 Perhaps they even share the same intentions, but they differ as to the means necessary to achieve 
them. 
26 C. Taylor, ‘How to define Secularism,’ in Alfred Stepan and Charles Taylor (eds), Boundaries of 
Toleration, Columbia University Press (2014), p. 61. 
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has to unravel the buried biases and tackle the negative emotional reactions to 
diversity. Then it has to reformulate its own secular commitments. In the process, the 
secular state is likely to realize that it can hardly rely on a political account but has to 
provide an ethical account of positive secularism. Thus, my account of positive 
secularism is ethical in that it claims to be normatively superior to any other 
alternative on comprehensive grounds as opposed to Rawls’ and Taylor’s framework  
which is supposed to be grounded on overlapping consensus that does not appeal to 
any comprehensive views.  
 
a. Political secularism 
 
Taylor’s account of political secularism is divorced from his account of a secular 
age.27 Taylor shows that the secular age has ushered in a great diversity of individual 
conceptions of the good that cannot be squared one with another.28 As a result, there 
are various secular dilemmas that arise in modern society. It is therefore puzzling that 
Taylor advocates state neutrality as the tool with which the state should deal with 
those dilemmas: what would it mean to be neutral between two competing values or 
goods that clash one against another? Taylor’s position seems to be oscillating 
between taking neutrality as a regulative principle and taking it as one of the values to 
be balanced. For example, he claims on one hand that: “the point of state neutrality is 
precisely to avoid favoring or disfavoring not just religious positions but any basic 
position, religious or non-religious. We can’t favor Christianity over Islam, but also 
religion over against nonbelief in religion or vice versa.”29 But on the other he 
criticizes French laïcité for being fixated on one single principle: “the dilemma and its 
resolution remain hidden under the illusion that there is only one principle here, say, 
laïcité and its corollary of the neutrality of public institutions or spaces.”30 The first 
quote treats neutrality as a regulative principle, while the second quote treats it one 
principle amongst others. This illustrates the point that Taylor oscillates between 
those two conceptions of neutrality without taking a clear position.  																																																								
27 Compare C. Taylor, A secular Age, HUP, (2007) with J. Maclure and C. Taylor, Secularism and 
Freedom of Conscience, HUP (2011).  
28 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, HUP, 2007.  
29 C. Taylor, ‘How to define Secularism,’ in Alfred Stepan and Charles Taylor (eds), Boundaries of 
Toleration, Columbia University Press (2014), 60-61. 30	C.	Taylor,	‘How to define Secularism,’ in Alfred Stepan and Charles Taylor (eds), Boundaries of 
Toleration, Columbia University Press (2014), 60.	
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Taylor bemoans the disappearance of a comprehensive Christian view of the world: 
he displays nostalgia towards an enchanted world that has disappeared, an age that 
has gone and that will not come back: the age of religious monism. Taylor is clear that 
western secularism has been so far obsessed by the quest to divide religion from 
power through a single simple-minded formula such as the wall of separation.31 But 
things are more complex than that, Taylor insists, and this is particularly so in plural 
societies where the point of secularism should be completely redefined: it should deal 
with religious and metaphysical diversity of all kind; it should not focus on the 
control of religion as orthodox secularism did.32 
 
If secularism is meant to protect diversity, then how do we define religion so that no 
belief is left behind? Taylor and Maclure argue in favour of a conception of freedom 
of religion that is radically subjective.33 In order to know what counts as religion one 
has to look at individual conscience. Each individual will be able to express its claim 
of conscience in a way that captures its depth and vulnerability. Religion is collapsed 
into the wider category of conscience. But by collapsing religion into conscience, 
Taylor puts at the center of its political doctrine a Christian protestant bias in favour 
of individualistic forms of religion based on conscientious claims.34 Thus, Taylor’s 
subjective definition of religion does not fully escape the problem of the Christian 
bias.  
 
If religion is radically subjective, then religious claims are likely to multiply. How 
does Taylor’s account deal with them? Taylor’s secularism deals with diversity by 
searching for equilibrium between the French trinity of values: liberty, equality and 
fraternity.35 In this context, liberty means that no religious view should be coerced to 
change or adopt different beliefs. Equality means that all religious and metaphysical 
views should be treated equally and none should be privileged. Fraternity means that 																																																								
31 Ibid., 61. 
32 Ibid., 59. 
33J. Maclure and C. Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, HUP (2011).  
34 For a similar point, see Cecile Laborde, “Protecting freedom of religion in the secular age,” the 
Immanent Frame, available at http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/04/23/protecting-freedom-of-religion-in-
the-secular-age/  35	Charles	Taylor,	‘How to define Secularism,’ in Alfred Stepan and Charles Taylor (eds), Boundaries 
of Toleration, Columbia University Press (2014),  61.	
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all views should be heard in matters of the constitution of society as well as on its 
policies to obtain the desired goals. The fundamental rethinking of secularism 
requires from the state a neutral position that relies on overlapping consensus as far as 
the general fundamentals are concerned, but with no pre-conception as to how the 
fundamentals will be balanced one with another. The trinity of values will bring 
inevitable conflicts, and will result in a set of dilemmas, which our societies are 
bound to face. To cope with such dilemmas, the secular state cannot adopt one size 
fits all solution, but should be patiently engaged in the negotiation of a collective 
identity that can only be done trough the good faith attempt to always secure the three 
or four goals mentioned above.  
 
We can single out from Taylor’s account two competing understanding of secularism. 
The former is historical secularism, a project shaped in the dark ages of church and 
state conflict. The latter is a positive, substantive, secularism that attempts to respond 
to the present age of diversity at the metaphysical and political level. Taylor believes 
that the context in which secularism has been formulated has changed beyond 
recognition, and it is now time to re-formulate the content of that concept in light of 
the profound changes of context.36 
 
I agree with that distinction: political and ethical secularism agree so far. It is high 
time to rethink secularism, and even to rescue it from its own negative reputation. It is 
not about religion any longer. But the two secular accounts part company over the 
concept of conscience. Is it possible to be neutral, if we start our analysis of freedom 
of religion from a concept such as conscience? The idea of conscience has a clear 
western root, and more precisely it has an obvious Christian connotation, and its 
interpretation divides protestant and Catholic Christianity.37 Can such a notion be the 
starting point of a neutral evaluation of freedom of religion? Instead of focusing on 
conscience as a source of moral knowledge and moral action as Taylor does, I focus 
instead on thought, and suggest that religious belief is an expression of diversity of 
thought.  
 																																																								36	Charles	Taylor,	‘How to define Secularism,’ in Alfred Stepan and Charles Taylor (eds), Boundaries 
of Toleration, Columbia University Press (2014), 63.	37	Richard	Sorabji,	Moral	Conscience	through	the	Ages.	Fifth	Century	BCE	to	the	Present,	OUP	(2014).		
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The second point of disagreement concerns the French trilogy of values. By 
suggesting that the French trilogy provides the content for secularism, Taylor does not 
address the problem of what to do when secular dilemmas arise. Secularism, to have a 
bite, should be able to give guidance as to the management of secular dilemmas that 
will have to be dealt with by political actors and judges. What can be done in those 
cases? What kind of compromises can be found if secular dilemmas are genuine? 
Taylor defends neutrality as a desirable regulative principle. Even if Taylor is 
cautious as to how the balance can be achieved, he nevertheless leaves ample powers 
to secular institutions to come up with a good faith balance of those values. But what 
does it mean to balance competing values in a way that preserve them all? This of 
course the central question, but Taylor does not really provide a method to answer it. 
So it is not clear what would qualify as a good faith attempt to balance competing 
values.   
 
Taylor’s new conception of secularism is more inclusive than negative secularism, but 
it is not immediately clear where its values originate. The French trinity constitutes a 
venerable wish list, but it is more of a stipulation than the realization that those values 
are constitutive of secularism. Taylor’s secularism wants to present itself as a 
practical response to the problem of managing diversity. It does not aim to replace the 
gap left by the waning away of the comprehensive religious view, as pointed out in 
Taylor’s A Secular Age. There is a hiatus between Taylor’s genealogical explanation 
of the move towards a secular age, and Taylor’s pragmatic secularism defended in the 
context of Canadian politics.38 In fact, Taylor’s political secularism runs the risk of 
simply upholding traditional Christian views in the garb of secular values.39 This is 
the case in particular when he defends freedom of conscience as the central tenet of 
any conception of religious freedom.40 Conscience is hardly a universal concept that 
																																																								38	J. Maclure and C. Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, HUP (2011).  39	The false assumption is that there is a sharp distinction between secular values and religious values. 
Secular values have been shaped and defined in relation to religious ones: thus ‘secular’ is often a 
negative property of that which is not religious. But then again, this implies that there is a stable 
definition of what qualifies a religious argument as well as a clear method to strip an argument from its 
religious garb. I find this disingenuous. Take for example, the principle of sanctity of life. It is used by 
religious and non-religious people in countless arguments on euthanasia, abortion etc…but who exactly 
holds the copyright to the understanding of sanctity of life, given that it is a religious idea to begin 
with? 	40	J. Maclure and C. Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, HUP (2011).  
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includes all forms of religious diversity. It is rather a Janus faced concept that has 
religious and secular facets.  
 
To conclude, there are two main problems with Taylor’s political secularism. Firstly, 
it defines religion by collapsing it into conscience. This move seems to be neutral and 
impartial but it is not. Conscience is the expression of a Christian protestant 
understanding of what religion should amount to, namely a private engagement with 
the divine that is not mediated by social institutions. Secondly, it acknowledges the 
existence of deep secular dilemmas, but does not offer a convincing way of dealing 
with them; to suggest that good faith attempt to balance competing values might be 
enough to deal with secular dilemmas does not take those dilemmas seriously. In 
order to cope with secular dilemmas we have to recognize that secularism is an ethical 
doctrine that defends the superiority of diversity over homogeneity; religious 
worldviews are but one expression of diversity and they can be protected as such but 
not more than that nor less. The idea is not to work towards an overlapping consensus, 
but to defend the necessary primacy of ethical secularism. 
 
b. Ethical Secularism 
 
Ethical Secularism takes secular dilemmas seriously. To suggest that it is possible to 
reach a compromise, as political secularism does, amounts to a denial of dilemmas, 
and to the silent entrenchment of the majority’s views on the place of religion in the 
public sphere. The fact that we face secular dilemmas must be taken as a sign of 
vitality of the political society. The conflict between the majority and the minorities 
of a society should not be swept under the carpet. It must be acknowledged and dealt 
with in a way that promotes a genuine exchange.  
 
Ethical secularism makes a non-neutral choice in favour of diversity and against 
homogeneity. Diversity works as an interpretive device of all other values: whenever 
a conflict between values is at stake, diversity works as a tiebreaker. Take for 
example the crucifix case: does its presence contribute to a more diverse environment 
or does it promote homogeneity? Diversity clearly militates against the presence of 
the crucifix. Diversity of worldviews is superior over homogeneity, which has been 
the European default position after the Treaty of Westphalia. After all, the very 
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homogeneity that characterized Europe after the Peace Treaty of Westphalia was an 
explicitly value-laden political decision taken at the international level in order to put 
an end to religious wars.41  It is time to replace homogeneity with diversity as a non-
neutral choice. The compromise entrenched by the Treaty of Westphalia can be 
rejected: we reject the idea that we have to carve out religiously homogeneous nation 
states out of a broader European political space. To be sure, Westphalia engineered 
homogeneity to cope with religious conflicts. An evil was certainly removed, but with 
it, the Westphalian political arrangement also removed the richness of socio-cultural 
and religious diversity. Postwar Europe regained very quickly a robust degree of 
diversity, and that contributes to a richer and more interesting environment; it is also a 
non-artificial environment. To be sure, it also contributes to a challenging political 
situation and the task of the secular state is to deal with diversity in a way that 
preserves its contribution and limits its risk. Ethical secularism has a strong 
instrumental component and a thin epistemological commitment.42 It is instrumental 
in the sense that it is the value with which European states can be nudged away from 
state homogeneity. It has a thin epistemological commitment in the sense that 
diversity does not stand for a fully-fledged substantive commitment. It simply 
challenges received ideas and works as a comprehensive worldview of worldviews, 
enabling rather than silencing them. 
 
It is necessary to move towards an affirmation of the secular age, something that 
Taylor is not prepared to do. Ethical secularism displays no nostalgia for our religious 
past: the secular age is presented as being superior over the prior religious age. As an 
illustration of the superiority we can take freedom of religion: religious freedom can 
only be realized in a secular framework where all religious and non-religious views 
can live and thrive one next to another. To do so, there must be at least a minimum 
core of unity that is common to all religious and non-religious people alike. Since 
religious ethical views cannot comprehend other views -because by definition one 
religious truth excludes other religious truths- we have to look for a secular view that 
promotes diversity. Religious freedom is not protected where one religion is the only 
one that dictates the rules of the game for everyone.   																																																								41	Lorenzo	Zucca,	A	Secular	Europe.	Law	and	Religion	in	the	European	Constitutional	Landscape,	Oxford:	OUP,	(2012).	
42 David Enoch, Political Philosophy and Epistemology, unpublished manuscript in file with the author.  
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The secular age is affirmed at three different levels. At the political level, ethical 
secularism is affirmed as the limitation of the authority of the state in matters of 
religious and non-religious diversity. In this sense, ethical secularism makes ample 
room for freedom of religion. At the moral level, it is a vision of how to live together 
that promotes genuine respect of religious and non-religious diversity. At the 
metaphysical level, it holds that diversity amounts to free thought. Thought is free 
when it is able to question itself constantly, but it is not necessarily presupposition-
less: it cannot be reduced to pure logic. Any thought starts from an assumption, and 
then goes on examining it under the light of reason. Unconstrained thought can both 
be religious or non-religious. Free thought is the ultimate and most basic element of 
ethical secularism; in turn, this profoundly changes the conception of religion we are 
working with. 
 
Ethical secularism is ultimately severed from any conventional understanding of 
religion since it regards religion as one particular expression of free thought. Free 
thought is compatible with the idea of starting from a set of assumptions. The fact that 
religion begins with an assumption about faith, singles it out as a special form of 
thought that is different from other forms of thought that postulate natural reason as 
the sole guiding light. Religious and non-religious thought are equally protected and 
equally open to further inquiry. Of course, beliefs will be open to challenge and when 
they will not be able to withstand those challenges, they will not be able to form the 
basis of any policy decision. Ethical secularism is positive in that it is not defined 
against religion, but it is instead an affirmation of diversity of thought. Religion as a 
result is not central to the definition of ethical secularism. Religion is one of the 
worldviews protected by it. Ethical secularism promotes a genuine exchange about all 
basic values and practices in our societies. The exchange does not require shedding 
one’s own assumptions, but it does ask every participant to bring those assumptions to 
the forefront and to be prepared to accept all the challenges that free thought can bring 
to various ethical views of religious and non-religious origin.  
 
It is a mistake to think that diversity of thought calls for legal pluralism. It is also a 
mistake to think that value pluralism is associated in any meaningful way with legal 
pluralism. Diversity of thought can be best realized within a unitary political 
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framework. Human beings set up political institutions to maintain a certain degree of 
stability despite human irrationality due to the natural primacy of emotional reactions. 
Human beings come together and form political communities as a matter of necessity: 
they know that to form bonds is much more likely to serve their interest in survival 
and it is also likely to accrue one’s own control over the external world. Political 
institutions are thus created to protect those basic human interests and as long as they 
are capable of serving those interests, they protect their existence; if political 
institutions start behaving in a way that undermines those basic human interests, then 
they become exposed to failure and ultimately to extinction.     
 
Political institutions can develop an instrument to deal with religious diversity: I call 
that instrument the marketplace of religions, which is a sub-system of the marketplace 
of ideas.43 The link between the ethical and the instrumental is not straightforward, so 
a few clarifications are in order: firstly, the connection is not direct; human beings 
have no access to the full knowledge of their biases; they only have a very 
fragmentary knowledge of human nature and of its own causal laws. Secondly, the 
impossibility of knowledge of human nature points to the inherent limits of human 
rationality that can at best work under less-than-ideal conditions of limited 
knowledge. Thirdly, limited rationality means that human beings are reaching 
practical decision on the basis of emotional reactions to the natural world. This means 
that prescriptive human laws have to engage with psychological motivations and 
provide appropriate answers to them. Fourthly, the success of a rule-maker will be 
measured by its ability to grasp the overarching interest of the community, while at 
the same time motivating people to strive together in that direction.  
 
From an epistemological perspective, secular political institutions can hardly be 
bound by the idea of an overlapping consensus amongst reasonable people. That is 
presupposing too much about our possibility to know where the consensus lies and 
our ability to maintain it despite inevitable conflicts of worldviews. If it is correct that 
the actual possibility of consensus on religious matters amongst reasonable people is 
out of reach, the commitment to neutrality put forward by political secularism 
																																																								
43 See chapter 5 in L. Zucca, A Secular Europe. Law and Religion in the European Constitutional 
Landscape, OUP (2012).   
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becomes problematic; 44  neutrality assumes that the secular state is completely 
separate and detached from any religion. But that is obviously not the case, and the 
existence of the double standard highlighted before shows the extent to which that is 
not true. The existence of inbuilt double standard makes neutrality impracticable and 
secularism weak. Neutrality is impracticable because European states automatically 
give preference to their own traditions that are inevitably rooted in one form of 
Christianity. Secularism is weak because it depends on its relation with one dominant 
religion. Neutrality could only make sense if biases could be completely removed. 
But this is unlikely to happen. And even if it could happen, until this has not 
materialized, it is necessary to suspend the talk of neutrality and start with the work 
on the removal of biases.  The marketplace of religions removes biases by giving 
more space to all religions, while subordinating all religions to the paramount 
requirements of free thought.  
 
The marketplace of religions has the following features: first of all, the state is not 
neutral towards religions. Historically, it treats some religions with great regards and 
distributes specific benefits and burdens; to improve on that record, the secular state 
has to eliminate the barriers of access to the marketplace of religions. So for example, 
a state with an established religion is likely to be creating undue burdens to other 
religions; it therefore has to improve its relations with non-established religions. It is 
important to understand that the marketplace of religions does not depend on the 
separation between religion and state. On the contrary, the marketplace of religions is 
there to organize collaboration between the state and religions. Collaboration does not 
require neutrality: the secular state collaborates with all the religions that offer goods 
and services for the society. In exchange for those goods and services, the secular 
state may grant some privileges to religions as long as they accept to exercise those 
privileges in accordance with the ordinary laws of the state. If a religious institution 
accepts a privilege, such as a tax break, it accepts to act as a provider of public 
services and cannot be exempted in any manner from the regular application of the 
law.  
 
The marketplace of religions is a sub-category of the marketplace of ideas. To this 																																																								44	Both	Rawls	and	Taylor	insist	that	liberal	neutrality	should	be	understood	against	the	background	of	the	overlapping	consensus.	
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extent, it recognizes a place of religion in the public sphere as an expression of an 
idea; if the idea conflicts with basic values of a liberal democratic society, then 
religion has an explanatory burden to overcome if the idea claims to be the basis of 
behavior that is not compatible with ordinary law.  In this way, religions open 
themselves up to rational scrutiny of their ideas and accept robust exchange between 
religious and non-religious people. Freedom of religion is protected as a form of free 
thought. Its protection is lowered when free thought turns into expression and action.  
The marketplace is the instrument through which the secular state can make sure that 
no religion curtails other freedoms or engages in discrimination.  
 
To move from religious conflicts to peace and stability, one has to have a double 
account. On one hand, ethical secularism affirms the superiority of diversity over 
homogeneity. On the other, it offers an instrument –the marketplace of religions—that 
treat religions as part of the unofficial public sphere45 and as partners of the state 
while at the same time subjecting them to constraints of freedom and equality that 
apply to all other public actors.  
 
c. Cashing out Ethical Secularism 
 
Ethical secularism does not ask states to show neutrality at the political level; instead 
it promotes one comprehensive view that prioritizes diversity over homogeneity. 
Ethical secularism requires the rethinking of political identity in light of the change of 
social identity. For example, Italy’s social homogeneity along catholic lines is no 
longer true; as a consequence Italy’s political identity should also be re-thought: it 
must become a secular state that caters for all its religious and non-religious citizens.. 
In other words, Italy in particular and Europe more generally must become Italy can 
be further criticized from the viewpoint of ethical secularism. A society with a very 
homogeneous population and a strict relation between Church and State can hardly 
make space for genuine diversity of worldviews. In such a context, ethical secularism, 
with its instrumental marketplace of religions, is going to have a deeper impact 
because it has to assist a mono-religious society move towards a religiously plural 																																																								45	See	J.	Habermas,	The	Structural	Transformation	of	the	Public	Sphere.	An	Inquiry	into	a	category	
of	Bourgeois	Society,	The	MIT	Press	(1991).	See	more	specifically,	Jurgen	Habermas,	‘Religion	in	the	Public	Sphere’,	1	European	Journal	of	Philosophy	(2006)	1-25.	
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one.46 self-consciously secular, rather than being secular by default. Europe needs to 
examine its psychological biases before turning to regulation and limitation of 
freedom and equality. France, for example, erred very badly when it presented the 
prohibition of burquas on public streets as a defense of freedom and equality. It is 
neither. Moreover, it entrenches a psychological bias against Muslim minorities.  
 
The stakes are very high. In order to remove one’s own psychological biases, one 
needs external help. The ECtHR can provide some help by bringing the national state 
to reconsider its own biases in a dialogic manner. Judicial institutions in Europe are 
the place where a discussion of that kind can begin. For the moment, unfortunately, 
the ECtHR is simply re-enforcing the status quo. Lautsi v Italy and SAS v France 
illustrate the problem of inbuilt biases and double standards. Majority religious 
symbols (the cross) are taken for granted. Minority religious symbols are contested 
everywhere, including when someone would like to display them privately. It is 
therefore not enough to ask the state to be neutral politically or legally, if it works on 
the basis of assumptions according to which Christian symbols are passive, while 
Islamic symbols are threatening. 47  Those assumptions cannot withstand robust 
scrutiny. Until the biases have been unraveled, there is no change to make neutrality 
work in any meaningful way. To unravel biases, it requires a systematic evaluation of 
one’s political commitments. The existence of biases is incompatible with any talk of 
legal or political neutrality.  
 
What can the ECtHR do then? The first step is to help nation states to unravel their 
own biases. The second step is to help to create instances of genuine re-thinking about 
one’s own identity. If a nation’s identity happens to be biased towards one religious 
identity, then these legal cases are the best starting point for a genuine exchange. I 
confess to have in-built biases myself. I have never felt the presence of the crucifix in 
the classroom. It was literally as any other piece of furniture: that was the point of the 
fascist decree that still defines what a classroom should look like. In 1929, when the 
decree was taken, it was not even a matter for discussion. Courts, classrooms, 																																																								
46 For a similar point see Nadia Urbinati, “The context of secularism: A Critical appraisal of the Post-
Secular Argument,” in Susanna Mancini and Michel Rosenfeld (eds), Constitutional Secularism in an 
Age of Religious Revival, Oxford: OUP (2014), p.15. 47	Lorenzo	Zucca,	‘A	Comment	to	the	Grand	Chamber	decision’,	11	International	Journal	of	
Constitutional	Law,	218-229.	
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administrations would display a crucifix. Who was there to object? The Italian society 
was still religious and homogeneous. Today, Italy’s homogeneity is waning, but there 
is no sign of a rethinking of the unilateral privileged relation between Church and 
State.48 It is also less religious, and in any case the post-war constitution introduces 
the notion of secularity of the state, that is to say that at least in principle the 
Constitution entrenches legal secularism as a fundamental tenet. The ECtHR could 
have helped Italy to reflect on the implications of its changing socio-cultural context 
as well as on its commitment to legal secularism.  
 
Italy has to respond to the changes of its society in order to remove the barriers that 
make co-existence between religious and non-religious people possible. The state has 
to engage in a serious and thoughtful debate about its identity and the symbols 
connected with them. The crucifix saga was the perfect moment to engage in such a 
debate: is Italy laic or is it religious? And more importantly, if it is laic as the 
Constitutional Court maintains, what does that imply? Ethical secularism as I defend 
it requires the state to be active and not merely neutral. Being active means first and 
foremost to engage in the debate wholeheartedly, which Italy has not done. Being 
active also means to come up with an official position that explains the principles of 
the state, as well as the decisions that flow from those principles. Italy has not done 
that; it simply reacted against change. It did not explain to people its position.  
 
The ECtHR had the chance to ask Italy to be a grown up and mature state; a state that 
treats the people as citizens, and not as children. But it did not do it. So the result is 
that Italy lives with the paradox of being constitutionally laic, while supporting 
Christian symbols. Here lies the problem of modern Europe: it is not serious about 
digging up the in-built biases that will result in more discrimination towards non-
Christian symbols and practices. To do so is to put one’s head in the sand and avoid 
talking about one’s psychological problems of intolerance and hatred towards 
immigrants of different cultural and religious background. The inability to tackle 
those emotions results in the success of populism, which by definition gains political 
advantage by rousing negative emotions.  
 																																																								
48 Nadia Urbinati, note 46, pp. 17-18. 
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Populism is rife in France. When France banned the full-face veil, it was clear more 
than in any other case that the state was acting on a populist basis.49 It was 
encapsulating in legislation the fears of French people towards Islam. 50  The 
legislation is purely symbolic and has limited effect on individual behavior: it only 
concerns two thousand women out of a Muslim population of over four million 
people.51 France is sending a message to the French electors and to the rest of Europe. 
The actual behavior of people is not important: those women that wear the veil are 
typically doing so for highly personal motives, and the full-face veil is not even 
supported by the French Muslim community. By limiting freedom of expression and 
freedom of religion of few women who want to wear a controversial dress, France 
gives up on its secular commitments rather than upholding them. Even worse, France 
embraces a populist attitude and transforms it into national legislation. The risk of 
populism is always present if the political representatives are allowed to play with the 
negative fears and biases of the country at large.  
 
A deeper issue surfaces here, and it is what European political leaders are failing to 
grasp: what happened in Paris with Charlie Hebdo is not only about religion. It is first 
and foremost about alienation of people not belonging to the mainstream society. 
Politicians right and left would like to isolate the threat of extremist religion or at best 
circumscribe it.52 They believe that one part of Islam leads to violent extremism, but 
completely fail to examine what are the responsibilities of national states. France and 
the UK have been failing their people in numerous different ways. They entrenched 
harsh economic inequalities throughout the society and they pursued illiberal policies 
trampling individual rights and privacy. The rise of extremism is a symptom of the 
crisis of the state.53  
 
 																																																								49	Patrick	Weil, ‘Headscarf v. Burqa: Two French bans with different meanings’, in Susanna Mancini 
and Michel Rosenfeld (eds), Constitutional Secularism in an Age of Religious Revival, Oxford: OUP, 
(2015). 	50	For	a	masterful	fictional	account,	see	Michel	Houellebecq,	Soumission	(2014).	51	Eva	Brems,	‘The experience of face veil wearers in Europe and the law,’ in Eva	Brems	(ed.),	
Diversity	and	European	Human	Rights.	Rewriting	Judgements	of	the	ECHR,	CUP,	(2015).	52	David	Cameron’s	speech	on	religious	extremism	in	Birmingham	delivered	on	the	20th	of	July	2015	,	available	here:	http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-extremism-speech-read-the-transcript-in-full-10401948.html		53	Lorenzo	Zucca,	‘The	Crisis	of	the	Secular	State:	A	reply	to	Prof.	Sajo,’	7	International	Journal	of	
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Alienation of young individuals go hand in hand with a loss of faith in liberal 
democracies: it is also about the status of immigrants in a society that is not capable 
of offering opportunities to disenfranchised individuals.54 Many have failed to notice 
what should be obvious. The first people to pay the price for economic decadence are 
the minorities in a society. Strong religion steps in at this point: when an individual is 
looking for answers that the state, and the society, are not providing the answers that 
individuals are seeking. 
 
Ethical secularism asks national states to be conscious of what kind of paths lead to 
radicalization. Schools, workplaces, and social media: alienation and estrangement 
from the mainstream society happen there; the state should be aware of it. When 
individuals are alienated, they resort to strong religion as a way to respond to their 
malaise. Either before they commit a crime or once they enter prison.55 Sometimes it 
may help them, but often it may radicalize them.  
 
The ECtHR has no power to tackle systematic biases arising from substantive 
inequalities, but it can ask national states to reflect on their shortcomings. Indeed, 
ethical secularism asks European institutions to address the underlining causes of 
religious strife, and does not simply offer a quick solution to discrete religious 
conflicts. The ECtHR has a responsibility that it cannot renounce: it must bring nation 
states to reflect about its own policies that entrench a double standard between the 
majority and the minority. When France excluded young Muslim girls from French 
public schools for wearing the veil, France contributed to disenfranchisement.56 
French public education is an instrument with which individuals are trained to 
become citizens of the republic. They cannot be expected to be citizens prior to 
entering school. Living together is a practice that can be facilitated by the state in 
major social institutions, such as schools. Living together cannot be used as a reason 
to criminalize the behavior of people who are alienated from the society. The ECtHR 
																																																								54	See	for	example	Obama’s	take	on	the	European	situation:	http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/16/obama-slaps-europe-for-failing-to-integrate-muslims/		55	Gabriele	Marranci,	Faith,	Ideology	and	Fear:	Muslim	Identities	Within	and	Beyond	Prisons,	Continuum	Religious	Studies	(2009).	56	See	for	a	full	account	of	more	than	twenty	years	of	debates,	Cecile	Laborde,	Critical	
Republicanism	and	the	Hijab,	OUP,	(2011).	
Rough	draft,	please	do	not	circulate	or	cite	
	 29	
should not have accepted such a lame justification on the part of France. It should 
have challenged it and asked France to reconsider it.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Europe needs to rethink secularism. It is often assumed that Europe is already secular, 
but that needs to be reassessed. I tried to show that Europe is committed to negative 
secularism, which is the product of past struggles, but not in touch with the present. 
Negative secularism thrives because of the existence of an enemy: fundamentalist 
religion. In this struggle, Europe has everything to lose. Negative secularism 
empowers the most aggressive religious minorities by putting them in the position of 
martyrs. Repression of religion provokes a strong backlash, and alienates moderate 
religious people. Europe’s long secular and religious heritage needs to be pulled apart 
and re-imagined.  
 
This paper suggested that ethical secularism should be at the center of a European 
secular manifesto. Ethical secularism’s central message is that diversity is superior 
over homogeneity. In order to thrive diversity of all kinds requires a stable unitary 
framework, the marketplace of religions. Ethical secularism is an affirmation of the 
secular age, rather than a negation of religion. Ethical secularism attempts to free 
itself from in-built biases against religious minorities to become a fully independent 
worldview of worldviews. The illustration used in this paper is the negative attitude 
towards European Muslims and towards Islam more generally. It is hard to deny that 
the European Court of Human Rights, for example, treats Islamic symbols and 
practices in a discriminatory fashion even if it starts with the recognition of freedom 
of religion for all.  
 
European courts will be successful if they address inbuilt biases that make religious 
minorities aliens in a society, while entrenching the beliefs and symbols of religious 
majorities. Living together means to develop an ethical secular framework within 
which all political and religious ideologies can find their place. What if those 
ideologies clash? Clashes are part and parcel of dynamic societies. The burden of 
ethical secularism is to remove buried assumptions from the table that only lull us into 
believing that liberal institutions can find compromises at little cost. It will thus make 
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sure that clashes can be channeled into moments of genuine exchange, which include 
actual debate about the place of the crucifix in the classroom or the prohibition of the 
full-face veil in the streets. Genuine exchange will not produce agreement. Lines will 
have to be drawn. But I suggested that lines drawn from a position of genuine 
openness, coupled with a clear instrumental framework such as the marketplace of 
religions, will be preferable over lines drawn from a position of in-built biases and 
illusions about overlapping consensus. 
 
Secularism is being questioned in Europe, but the question is not whether or not we 
want secularism; rather it is about which conception of secularism we want. The 
question we have to ask is: what do we want Europe to be like? Do we want it to be a 
racist place that discriminates those people that do not fit the rather narrow profile 
shaped by the European Christian past? Or do we want it to be an open place that is 
confident about its secularism and its achievements and for that reason it can afford a 
great amount of genuine diversity without falling apart? I opt for the second.   
 
 
 	
